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Introduction
The boundaries of genocide are persistently contested in both jurisprudence and socio-historical 
analysis. Our socio-analytical, juridical, and popular perceptions of the term genocide are shaped 
by its origins in the Holocaust. The Genocide Convention arises out of this context and the more 
closely mass atrocities resemble the Holocaust in form, extent, and motive the more likely they are 
to be labelled genocide. 
Yet many cases of genocide are atypical in the sense that they do not conform closely to these 
Holocaust-based understandings of genocide. West Papua, the western half of the island of New 
Guinea, may be one such case.1 The continuing influence of the Holocaust over our perceptions of 
genocide contributes to a substantial blind spot in genocide—so-called slow motion genocides. Such 
genocides occur incrementally, over years, or even generations. Colonial or neo-colonial genocides 
targeting indigenous peoples often occur in such a manner. In these cases the physical destruction 
of the indigenous people may not be directly intended; rather, the perpetrators substantially 
undermine the foundations of existence for indigenous groups through systemic oppression 
or wilfully reckless policies. These policies are often rooted in dehumanising constructions 
of indigeneity whereby indigenous people are said to be primitive obstacles to the progress of 
civilization and the collective interests of the legitimate political community.
In West Papua indigenous peoples have had their identity, autonomy, and physical security 
substantially undermined through the neo-colonial policies of the Indonesian state. This systematic 
campaign appears to be genocidal in that it aims at the disappearance of the (West) Papuan group, 
as an autonomous political and ethnic identity; yet, it is difficult to classify as genocide due to the 
survival of most Papuan individuals.  Moreover, any ostensibly genocidal policies in West Papua 
have indirect intent and gradual result. In this article I will explore the case of West Papua as a 
means towards addressing slow-motion genocides, or cold genocides, as I have labelled them in 
my analytical framework. It will situate colonial genocides within the broader phenomenon of 
genocide, before analysing the case of West Papua. It will also critically assess the implications of 
the West Papua case, and similar cases, for our understanding of genocide. The purpose of this 
paper is not to prove or disprove the occurrence of genocide in West Papua. Rather, it utilises the 
case of West Papua to illuminate the boundaries and morphologies of genocide with particular 
reference to indigenous peoples. It will argue that not all genocides are high-intensity episodes 
of mass killing, rather the destruction of the group can also be realized through cold genocides 
characterised by gradual destruction and limited killing. 
Primitivism and Progress: Colonialism and Genocide
Genocide is a relatively recent concept, yet the phenomenon encapsulated in the term is an ancient 
and persistent dilemma. When Raphael Lemkin first crafted the concept of genocide in 1941, 
he was undoubtedly informed by contemporaneous atrocities in Nazi-occupied Europe, yet he 
saw genocide as a recurrent historical phenomenon. Moreover, his writings specifically linked 
genocide and the practice of colonialism.2 Even so, colonial genocides, and neo-colonial genocides 
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in particular, are far more contested in genocide scholarship than the canonical genocides of the 
twentieth century such as the Holocaust, Rwandan Genocide, and Armenian Genocide. 
The colonial genocide debate often centres on the means and intention of the perpetrators; 
specifically, did the perpetrators act with the intent to destroy the group, and was the campaign 
focused on physical destruction? Much of this debate arises from a particular interpretative lens for 
the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which privileges 
high-intensity campaigns of killing over other more gradual genocidal approaches. 
Delving into the question of intent also involves addressing broader questions of perpetrator 
motivation, which situate perpetrator behaviour dichotomously in either rational instrumentality 
or irrational racial hatred. Both of these schools of thought are, of course, overly reductionist. 
Genocide is never fully instrumental nor fully prejudicial. Rather, motive is better assessed on the 
basis of the weighing of these two paradigmatic characteristics: instrumentality (genocide arising 
from the purpose of gaining or maintaining power) and prejudice/orthodoxy (genocide arising 
from the perpetrators’ ideologically-based derogatory view of the victimised group). Within these 
characteristics we can further disaggregate prejudicial motives into hate (a desire to destroy the 
victim group on the basis of their perceived negative characteristics) and supremacy (an assumed 
supremacy over the victimised population, which allows, but does not require, their destruction). 
Instrumental motives for genocide are centred on the use of genocide as a tool to gain or 
maintain power through the destruction of perceived threats, and also the consolidation and 
concentration of power among the in-group. Yet genocide, as the deliberate destruction of a racial, 
ethnic, national, or religious group, always entails a degree of prejudicial motivation. Indeed, the 
targets of such destruction appear to be chosen solely on the basis of ascribed identity; in genocide 
markers of identity are determinate of life and death. Prejudicial ideologies marginalize victim 
groups, transforming them into valueless objects or enemies, allowing them to be destroyed.  
Colonialism is characterised by a regime of foreign domination, the expropriation of land and 
resources, and the imposition of foreign ideologies and belief systems. In such circumstances the 
destruction of indigenous peoples is often seen as incidental and inevitable. In a sense, then, the 
destruction of the victims is motivated less by hate and more by assumed supremacy.3 Supremacy 
can be distinguished from hate in that in supremacy crimes the victim is not seen as an existential 
threat. Once victims become a perceived existential threat, i.e. in cases where they resist the 
perpetrators’ imposition of authority, perpetrator motivation may transition from supremacy to 
hate. Hate crimes, unlike supremacy crimes, require the complete destruction of the offending 
group – assimilation is no longer a reasonable possibility. Such destruction is deemed essential 
to the survival of the perpetrator group. The victim group’s threat may be constructed in terms 
of their power or their pollution. In many cases victims may be so devalued that their destruction 
becomes immaterial, a functional means to an end.4  
In the colonial context, resistant groups, such as the Herero in German Southwest Africa, are 
no longer seen as so-called noble savages but rather a malevolent force. For example, in the official 
inquiry following the German genocide of the Herero and Nama indigenous peoples in 1904, the 
causes of the killing were determined to be “the arrogance of the natives and…their confidence 
in their superiority over the Germans.”5 When colonial genocides are motivated by hate they are 
more likely to be manifested as direct killing and easier to identify as genocide. In contrast, many 
colonial genocides targeting indigenous peoples are built on notions of supremacy and utilise the 
broad destructive means foreseen in Raphael Lemkin’s definition of genocide:
A coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations 
of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The 
objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of 
culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, 
and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the 
individuals belonging to such groups.6
In contrast to Lemkin, I believe that the aim of colonial genocides is not always the annihilation 
of the group; rather, such annihilation could be an acceptable outcome, incidental to other policy 
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goals. This destruction of the group is rooted in ideologies of racial supremacy whereby civilization 
and culture exist in direct opposition to biology. In fact, the closer a group is perceived to be to 
living in a state of nature, the more it can be said to lack civilization. Bodies without civilization 
are animal bodies. Thus, indigenous peoples, traditionally living in close connection to the natural 
world, are dehumanised and placed outside of the human moral community. 
Peoples conceptualized as primitive, such as the indigenous inhabitants of West Papua, are not 
fully-valued but rather exist only as obstacles to progress, a half-human component of a menacing 
topography. Progress in this worldview is seen as the conquest of the natural world through the 
maximal exploitation of resources. Colonialism seeks to exert total power over the environment of 
which indigenous peoples are a part. While some scholars have argued that the intention of colonial 
regimes was (and is) the exploitation of labour and natural resources rather than the destruction 
of the indigenous labour pool, this construction of colonialism ignores the desire of the colonial 
regimes to possess the land in its entirety, irrespective of the local population.7 Total possession is 
only possible if the indigenous inhabitants are a non-entity, either destroyed or invisible. Counter-
currents of indigenous resistance may also romanticize indigenousness as a means to condemn 
foreign interlopers or even to justify discrimination against non-indigenous groups (for example, 
the case of Fiji and the treatment of Indo-Fijians).  
The removal or destruction of indigenous peoples is often instrumental, yet still deeply rooted 
in prejudicial notions privileging in-groups and denigrating out-groups. In many cases where 
indigenous peoples are substantially destroyed through interaction with foreign groups, this 
destruction lacks the directed nature of genocides, such as the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. 
Rather indigenous genocides bear the flavour of inevitability. The discourse goes that the 
extinction of indigenous groups is an inevitable result of historical progress – like the dodo bird, 
indigenous peoples suffer evolutionary unfitness: a failure to adapt and thrive in the modern 
world.8 For example, British theologian Frederic Farrar, a pallbearer at Darwin’s funeral, argued 
that indigenous peoples were “irreclaimable savages” predestined to “disappear from before the 
face of it [earth] as surely and as perceptibly as the snow retreats before the advancing line of 
sunbeams.”9 This inevitability also acts as a causal explanation for the disappearance of indigenous 
peoples.10 Inevitability removes agency and neutralises the accountability of perpetrators, a pattern 
of perpetrator self-justification familiar to genocide scholars. Yet the difficulty with establishing 
explicit intentionality in some cases of the destruction of indigenous peoples (for example through 
disease, forced displacement, or ethnocide) challenges mainstream interpretations of genocide. 
Perpetration may not be intentional in the manner envisaged in the Genocide Convention, but 
rather, foreseeable. Inevitability also occurs in non-colonial genocides, yet in those genocides it 
arises from the power of the perpetrators and the context created by the state rather than racial 
notions of inferiority.11 
Indigenous groups have long been subject to racist ideologies, which characterise them 
as inferior. Indeed, the assumption of all civilizing missions is that indigenous peoples are 
fundamentally primitive and that only by removing the very fact of their indigenousness can 
progress be achieved. Prejudicial theories also provide a ready explanation and justification for the 
monopolisation of economic and political power by colonial powers.12  
The key features of colonial genocides include: their foreign (extraterritorial) origin, their 
strongly instrumental character (where the primary objective is the seizure of territory and 
resources), and their frequent focus on the essential conditions of life of indigenous groups rather 
than direct physical extermination, although such exterminatory killing also takes place in certain 
cases. Indigenous groups are often characterised as being primitive and racially inferior rather than 
being insidious enemies in the manner of, for example, the Tutsis of Rwanda. While colonies have 
all but disappeared from the world, with notable exceptions such as French Polynesia, colonial 
ideologies in the form of engrained notions of racial superiority and justifiable dominion over so-
called primitive groups persist in many countries worldwide such as Indonesian West Papua. 
The Case of West Papua
Since contact with Europeans, West Papua has often been seen by outsiders as a primitive and 
marginal region. Under Dutch rule West Papua was a periphery of the periphery: it was marginal 
Anderson12
to the Dutch East Indies, which were themselves marginal in relation to the Netherlands core. This 
marginality has continued under Indonesian rule, whereby West Papua is a kind of resource-rich 
hinterland – an empty treasure trove for the state of Indonesia. The Papuans themselves are often 
depicted as stone age – a timeless people existing outside of the inexorable march of historical 
progress. This apartness of the Papuans is often either romanticised or demonised: West Papua is an 
anachronistic museum piece to be preserved or destroyed in the context of modernisation.
West Papua has been inhabited by Papuan peoples for at least forty-two thousand years.13 
The Papuans are Melanesians, a cultural and ethnic grouping which includes most of the people 
living in the Southwest Pacific (in countries such as Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, the Solomon 
Islands, New Caledonia, and Fiji). The island is large, rugged and isolated from major population 
centres; for much of their history Papuans lived in many small villages spread throughout this 
vast landscape (New Guinea is the second largest island in the world). This isolation contributed 
to the development of a tremendous ethno-linguistic diversity with 1,319 languages spoken in 
the Melanesian region (the majority of which are on the island of New Guinea).14 Prior to foreign 
domination West Papua was governed by numerous small states.15 
The island was named by Spanish explorers in 1546, who thought that the inhabitants 
resembled the Guineans of West Africa. The French and British also made incursions into West 
Papua but the Dutch were the first to set up a presence on the island. The Dutch governed indirectly 
by recognizing the sovereignty of its vassal state, the Sultanate of Tidore, over New Guinea in 1660. 
The island was seen as possessing too great a challenge with too meagre material rewards for the 
Dutch to directly colonize. Although the Dutch established administrative posts in West Papua 
in 1898 and 1902, Dutch intervention remained minimal.  Nonetheless, local resentment towards 
colonial officials brought in from other parts of the Dutch East Indies grew, with some Papuans 
regarding them as amberi (foreigners who talk sweet but have evil intentions); in turn Indonesians 
looked upon Papuans as bodoh (ignorant).16 Royal Dutch Shell also began to develop West Papua’s 
oil reserves in 1907.
When Indonesia became independent in 1949, the Dutch retained West Papua as a separate 
territory, to be granted independence at a later date, on the grounds that the Papuans were a 
distinct people and territory, thus not really part of the Dutch East Indies at all. The Dutch also 
desired to retain West Papua as a Dutch foothold in Southeast Asia. Indonesia continued to 
claim the contrary, on the grounds that all of the former Dutch East Indies constituted a single 
territorial entity, to form the basis for the new state of Indonesia. This claim was rejected by some 
of Indonesia’s founding fathers, notably Mohammed Hatta, on the grounds that Papuans were 
racially distinct.17 Nonetheless, a propaganda campaign was initiated calling for the ‘reunification’ 
of West Papua with Indonesia. 
Upon rejection of a proposed 1957 UN resolution recognizing Indonesian sovereignty over 
West Papua, Indonesian President Sukarno seized Dutch enterprises in Indonesia and announced 
the expulsion of Dutch residents.18 Four years later Papuans prepared for independence by creating 
their flag, the morning star, and electing representatives to a New Guinea Council. Sukarno 
responded by calling on Indonesians to liberate the territory of West Papua from Dutch rule so that 
it could be reunited with the rest of Indonesia. After significant Indonesian military incursions in 
1962 (defeated by the Dutch), and facing growing international pressure, the Netherlands agreed 
to a staged transition of West Papua to Indonesian rule on the condition of a plebiscite on the future 
of the territory. Constantin Stavropoulos, the United Nations’ legal counsel at that time, argued 
that there was a strong presumption’ in favour of the self-determination of the Papuans.19
A plebiscite of sorts occurred in 1969. The referendum, dubbed the Act of Free Choice by 
Indonesia and the Act Free of Choice by the Papuan independence movement, gathered 1025 tribal 
leaders who ‘decided’ unanimously to join Indonesia.20 These tribal leaders were under severe 
intimidation, even being threatened at gunpoint.21 Moreover, it is questionable whether this 
selection of chiefs was truly representative of broader Papuan opinion. 
Indonesian governance in West Papua has been characterised by this same indifference to the 
views and interests of the local populace. Moreover, under Indonesian rule indigenous Papuans 
have been subject to a range of systematic and widespread human rights abuses such as torture, 
extrajudicial killings, forced labour, forced displacement, rape, and forced disappearance.22 
©2015     Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.2.1270
Colonialism and Cold Genocide: The Case of West Papua
©2015     Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.2.1270
13
Indonesian policies have also done significant environmental damage, undermining the cultural, 
political, and economic bases of Papuan society, and contributing to the prevalence of disease among 
indigenous peoples in West Papua due to inadequate provision of health and sanitation facilities.23 
These policies may not have been intentionally directed at the destruction of the Papuans, yet they 
were undertaken with deliberate disregard for the welfare of the Papuans and knowledge of the 
destructive consequences for the Papuan group. 
Under Indonesian rule West Papua has seen its significant oil, mineral, and timber wealth 
exploited by Indonesian and multi-national enterprises (such as Freeport McMoRan), with limited 
benefits (and employment opportunities) for the local population.24 Papuans have been historically 
under-represented in the oil and resource-extraction industries.25 
Another manifestation of Indonesian oppression in West Papua is the severe restrictions placed 
on personal liberty. These restrictions encompass arbitrary detention for months or even years at 
a time, restricted movement in many regions for security reasons, restrictions on the freedom of 
speech and assembly, and the requirement that people obtain a Surat Jalan (travel permit) before 
traveling to their home villages.26
Indonesia has also implemented a transmigration program whereby Indonesians from 
densely populated provinces (such as Java, Madura, and Bali) are given incentives to settle in less 
densely populated provinces (such as Sumatra, Borneo, and West Papua). This program actually 
originated with the Dutch colonial regime, but it continued and accelerated under Indonesia. It is 
impossible to locate accurate official statistics on the number of transmigrants but the International 
Working Group for Indigenous Affairs estimates that these transmigrants now comprise about half 
of West Papua’s population of 2.7 million inhabitants.27 These transmigrants include both official 
transmigrants, who are part of government programs, and spontaneous transmigrants who arrive 
in West Papua through Indonesian government encouragement but not official programs. 
The transmigration program is similar to the colonisation initiatives which existed in other 
settler societies such as Canada, Australia, and South Africa. Such policies consider the land to be 
terra nullius – empty or underutilized land – and aim at both the pacification of the local indigenous 
population and the economic exploitation of their lands. Many of the transmigrants are retired 
Indonesian soldiers moved into strategic areas such as mines and ports, as well as the Papua New 
Guinea border, where the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement or OPM) guerrillas 
are most active.28 Moreover, transmigrants are given many benefits not available to Papuans; this 
constitutes a form of structural discrimination which limits Papuan economic opportunities.  
Moreover, in many cases, the settlement of transmigrants is preceded by the forced displacement 
of indigenous Papuans, who are only allowed to remain in a transmigrant area at a ratio of one 
Papuan family to nine non-Papuan families.29 By 1984 approximately 700,000 hectares of land had 
been confiscated, without compensation, from indigenous Papuans under the transmigration 
program.30 The arrival of significant numbers of outsiders has also coincided with greatly increased 
rates of disease, particularly HIV. In 2002 West Papua represented 40% of Indonesia’s total HIV and 
AIDS cases with only 1% of its total population.31  
Transmigration and settlement also serve the purpose of undermining the self-determination 
of the local population by rendering them a minority – a distinctive disadvantage in ethnically-
polarised democratic systems. It appears that the transmigration process will continue for the 
foreseeable future, until the goal of moving millions of people is reached. This serves the purpose of 
helping to reduce over-population and encouraging development; however these policies have also 
created conflict as indigenous peoples are swamped by outside settlers (such conflict has occurred 
in all regions receiving transmigrants). The Indonesian government does not recognize indigenous 
groups as being distinct in any manner; rather it considers all Indonesians to be indigenous.32 
Transmigration is part and parcel of a larger project of cultural assimilation, including the 
mandatory use of Indonesian as the medium of instruction in schools. This use of Indonesian has 
contributed to the decline and extinction of several indigenous Papuan languages.33 Papuan beliefs, 
cultural practices, and lifestyles are deemed to be primitive and in need of benign custodianship. 
Progress, in this conception, is a move away from primitivism, which is itself a move away from 
traditional subsistence lifestyles and towards the cash economy. For example, the so-called 
Operasi Koteka (Operation Penis Gourd) in 1971-1972 sought to encourage tribes in certain New 
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Guinea highland areas to abandon the Koteka and to wear modern clothing.34 Such markers of 
modernisation are also a repudiation of the primitive past.  
Modernisation also entails a move away from environmental sustainability (relatively ‘light’ 
land use such as traditional agriculture) to more intensive and less sustainable land uses such 
as mining. The environmental destruction in West Papua is a direct consequence of Indonesian 
development policies such as transmigration and the exploitation of natural resources.35 Although 
there have been material benefits to some indigenous Papuans (such as schools being built by 
mining companies), these economic activities have also displaced and alienated many indigenous 
peoples from their traditional lands. Between 1982 and 1990 an average of 163,000 hectares of forest 
was destroyed annually in West Papua.36 Furthermore, people living close to resource-rich areas 
are often displaced, and a great deal of fertile land has been distributed to transmigrants. Papuan 
resistance to these measures has been met with increasing militarisation and political oppression. 
The region is currently the most heavily militarised in Indonesia with an estimated 45,000 troops 
present.37  
The Free Papua Movement (OPM or Organisasi Papua Merdeka) was founded in 1963 to 
advocate for the autonomy of West Papua. Over time the OPM became increasingly militant, 
for example, in 1977 it cut the fuel and slurry pipelines to the Freeport (Grasberg) mine. This 
resulted in indiscriminate reprisal attacks from the Indonesian military that burned down entire 
villages in the vicinity of the mine.38 By the 1980s violence in West Papua had escalated into a 
low-intensity armed conflict, which continues to this day. As many as 100,000 people have been 
killed in subsequent years, mostly civilians killed by the Indonesian State.39 Although the OPM 
is well-established throughout West Papua it is lightly armed with most fighters not even having 
firearms.40 
Opposition to the Jakarta regime is seen by Indonesian nationalists as more than mere 
difference of opinion; rather it represents a rebellion against the rationalism of modernity. As such, 
indigenous resistance is a threat to the broader Indonesian nation-building project. The assertion of 
ethnically-derived difference in the face of the state-building projects of newly constituted states is 
a threat to the project as a whole.41 Such forms of pluralism are not acceptable in the process of state 
formation, which seeks to make the nation synonymous with the state. In fact, unity is enshrined 
as the second principle of the PANCASILA philosophy, found in the preamble of the Indonesian 
Constitution.42 This kind of state formation, the dream of a created monolithic nationalism arising 
out of diverse peoples and political units, is at the core of the dream of the nation-state. Such 
nation-states (like Spain and Turkey) are truly imagined communities.43  
The notion of threat is increased when one couples this ideological threat to nation-building 
with the presence of an affine community in a neighbouring state (most directly the Papuans in 
Papua New Guinea, but also the Melanesians in the Southwest Pacific, who have greater cultural 
affinities with the Papuans than the Indonesians do). Non-conforming Papuans (i.e. those opposed 
to Indonesian rule) may therefore be seen as a fifth column within Indonesia. The prior renaming 
of West Papua as Irian Jaya (victorious Irian) reinforced the notion that West Papua is part and 
parcel of the Indonesian national project, which is itself supposedly anti-colonial in nature. 
The Special Autonomy Law of 2001 was promulgated with the intention (on the part of 
Indonesian moderates) of giving West Papua a degree of autonomy.44 However, this law seems to 
have made little difference on the ground. It has resulted in the Papuanisation of upper levels of 
the bureaucracy but Papuans have little real autonomy.45 The Special Autonomy Law also required 
the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission for West Papua, which has still not been 
established.
The Indonesian military exerts a great influence over Indonesian politics and, according to 
an Indonesian government official quoted in a US diplomatic cable, it operates in West Papua as 
a “virtually autonomous government entity”.46 Military interests in West Papua, both as a power 
base and a source of revenue have increased since the loss of East Timor and Aceh; Jim Elmslie 
argues: “TNI [military] involvement in legal businesses, such as mining and logging, and illegal 
businesses, such as alcohol, prostitution, extortion, wildlife smuggling, etc., provide significant 
funds for the TNI as an organization and also for individual TNI members, especially senior 
officers.”47 
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International pressure to resolve the West Papua situation has also increased in recent years. 
The violent suppression of the Papuan People’s Congress, coupled with a strike at the Grasberg 
Mine in 2011, led to a statement from US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton that Indonesia needed to 
“address the legitimate needs of the Papuan people.”48 
Genocide and West Papua
This brings us to the question as to whether the events in West Papua can accurately be 
characterised as genocide. The normative weight of the term genocide undoubtedly contributes to 
its overuse and abuse. Genocide, as the crime of crimes, is seen by many as a supreme validation of 
victimisation; this is true even when one considers that other international crimes, such as crimes 
against humanity, have grave consequences for the victims.  
It is difficult to make the case that Indonesian oppression in West Papua amounts to a genocide 
similar to the Holocaust or Rwandan Genocide. There is no systematic pattern of mass killing; in 
fact, in gross terms, the indigenous Papuan population is actually increasing.49 One could also 
argue that the Papuans are fragmented – that identity is more localised and tribal than national 
and as such Papuans may not constitute a national group. Paradoxically, Indonesian oppression 
in West Papua may have itself been instrumental in the formation of a national Papuan identity.50 
The central elements which must be proven for any crime are the occurrence of the criminal 
act(s) and the intention of the perpetrator to commit these acts. In genocide there is the additional 
intent requirement of having the intention to destroy the group in whole or in part. Let us examine 
each of these elements as they relate to the case of West Papua. 
In West Papua there has not been any large-scale campaign of killing, rather killings have 
mostly taken the form of the political repression of the independence movement (for example 
by targeting those who raise the Papuan Morningstar Flag). In 2001 the US State Department’s 
Country Report on Indonesia notes:
Security forces were responsible for numerous instances of, at times indiscriminate, shooting 
of civilians, torture, rape, beatings and other abuse, and arbitrary detention in . . . Papua . . 
. Security forces in Papua assaulted, tortured, and killed persons during search operations 
for members of militant groups. The security forces inconsistently enforced a no-tolerance 
policy against flying the Papuan flag, tearing down and destroying flags and flag poles, and 
killing eight persons, and beating others who tried to raise or protect the flag.51
More recently, dozens of protesters were arrested on the anniversary of West Papua’s 
annexation.52 Indonesian soldiers have also assassinated independence leaders on several occasions, 
such as Yustinus Murib, Danny Kogoya and Theys Hiyo Eluay, although the state of Indonesia 
has denied that it officially sanctioned these killings.53 Such killings could arguably constitute the 
crime against humanity of persecution, but do not necessarily constitute genocide as such. It is 
likely that many incidents of violence occurring in remote areas simply go unreported for fear of 
reprisals. The Indonesian government has also severely restricted access into the region for foreign 
journalists and human rights organisations. 
There is a stronger argument to be made for Article 2 (c) of the convention – causing serious 
bodily or mental harm. In his thesis Budi Hernawan argues that the widespread use of torture 
functions as a mode of governance in West Papua. Effectively, the use of torture is a tool of 
subjugation – illustrating in graphic form to all who see the scars of the torture victims (or who hear 
of acts of torture) that Papuan bodies are not sacrosanct. Rather, bodies themselves belong to the 
state. Moreover, the vulnerability of Papuan bodies also shows that Papuans may not be considered 
to be full members of the political community. Indeed, the bodily and psychological persecution 
of indigenous Papuans may constitute a self-evident statement as to the moral wrongfulness of 
opposition to the Indonesian state and a self-admission of guilt.54  
The Indonesian counter-insurgency Operation Clean Sweep of 1981 was accompanied by 
the slogan Biar tikus lari kehutan, asal ayam piara dikandang (let the rats run into the jungle so that 
chickens can breed in the coop), i.e. remove Papuans from areas so that they can be taken over by 
transmigrants.55 This is effectively what occurred in the aftermath of the operation.56 Operation 
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Clean Sweep resulted in the killing of at least 2,500 Papuans (the Indonesian government estimate), 
and as many as 13,000 (an estimate given by Dutch journalists).57 Many other such massacres have 
occurred through indiscriminate Indonesian attacks and collective punishment. For example, in 
June and July of 1985, 517 civilians were killed in several highland villages in retaliation for an 
earlier skirmish between the OPM and ABRI (Indonesian Army).58
The collective punishment of the counter-insurgency operations, when coupled with the 
transmigration program and forced assimilation, could be said to constitute a sort of genocidal 
project, albeit occurring over the course of decades rather than months. Demographic projections 
indicate that Papuans, who represented 96.09% of the population of West Papua in 1971, will only 
constitute 28.99% of the population by 2020.59 While demographic decline is not, in and of itself, 
genocidal, Indonesian policies foreseeably contribute to the disappearance of the Papuans as a 
politically-constituted nation; such policies and aims are consistent with Lemkin’s definition of 
genocide but not the Genocide Convention. 
We must also consider whether the Indonesian state, through its policies, is “deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole 
or in part” (Article 2(c) of the Genocide Convention). This provision was intended to cover cases of 
intentional indirect killing such as famine within concentration camps. However, the conditions of 
life of groups must differ depending on their particular cultural, socio-political, and environmental 
context. For certain groups (i.e. those groups practicing subsistence agriculture) land is more 
than monetised property – it is also an anchor for physical (food) security. Forced displacement, 
environmental destruction, or even the suppression of traditional knowledge (such as techniques of 
food cultivation) could dramatically decrease the physical security and sustainability of the group. 
Reports have indicated, for instance, that areas subject to intensive logging may be submerged due 
to soil erosion.60 The UN has also noted that current development plans in West Papua run the risk 
of decreasing the food security of tens of thousands of Papuans.61 In some cases the Indonesian 
government has directly destroyed the crops of Papuans.62 Such practices can certainly be harmful 
to the physical and mental well-being of the group.
We can also distinguish here between voluntary and forced assimilation. In voluntary 
assimilation members of the group may decide, for example, to voluntarily adopt different cultural 
practices, to participate in mining or other non-traditional resource exploitation, or to adopt a 
different cultural identity. In contrast, forced assimilation involves an intentional state policy 
directed towards the ethnocide of the group. In practice ethnocide (cultural genocide) is difficult to 
separate from physical genocide. Cultural genocide was excluded from the convention as a result of 
a political bartering process. Yet, where cultural genocide is linked inextricably to physical genocide, 
acts that may be characterised as cultural genocide should in fact be plainly considered genocide.
Beyond the presence of genocidal acts, the Genocide Convention requires genocidal intent (the 
intent to destroy the group in whole or in part). This is difficult to prove in many circumstances yet 
it can be inferred from the overall context.63 Intent may also arguably be inferred from the nature 
of the criminal act itself. For example:
In 1970, soldiers patrolling the jungle border area shot and killed a pregnant woman, cut 
the baby from the mother’s womb, and dissected it in front of 80 women and children of the 
village. At the same time, a group of soldiers raped and killed the pregnant woman’s sister. 
In 1998, in order to disrupt a pro-independence demonstration, the Indonesian navy used 
force on the participants. It is alleged that women were taken out to sea on Indonesian navy 
ships, where they were raped, sexually mutilated and thrown overboard. Women’s corpses 
reportedly washed up on the Biak coast. Some of them showed signs of sexual mutilation; 
breasts had been removed.64
Such acts of violence are indicative of genocide intent (the intent to destroy the group) as they 
symbolically and literally target the means of physically sustaining the group, namely women’s 
procreative functions. 
Prejudicial beliefs underlie many of these policies. For example, an Indonesian textbook 
discussed West Papua (Irian) in terms reminiscent of the terra nullius doctrine:
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The countryside of Irian has not yet been cultivated because of the lack of people…Civilization 
is uneven…some are completely backward (in the interiors of Seram and Irian). It is clear 
that the level of civilization depends on the degree of intercourse with other, advanced 
ethnic groups or nations.65
Such a sentiment may be genocidal in its implications. It is not direct or public incitement to 
genocide; it does not call for the extermination or destruction of the Papuans, yet it does treat 
Papuans in a way that makes it clear that they have no intrinsic value or presence as human beings. 
In practical fact the Papuans have little in common culturally with the rest of Indonesia. Indonesia 
is a majority Muslim country while Papuans are majority Christian. For example, the centrality of 
pigs in many Papuan cultures and diets reinforces Indonesian perceptions of Papuan primitivism.66 
This also eases the production and perpetuation of the ‘us-them’ dichotomies necessary for 
systematic persecution.
In 2007 Indonesian General Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian, military commander of the Jayapura 
region, threatened the brutal and indiscriminate use of force against Papuan separatists when he 
told the Cenderawish Pos newspaper:
What is absolutely certain is that anyone who tends towards separatism will be crushed by 
the TNI…In the interests of the Republic of Indonesia, we are not afraid of human rights. We 
are quite prepared to imprison anyone, or dismiss them from their posts, whatever is in the 
interest of Indonesia…If I meet anyone who has enjoyed the facilities that belong to the state, 
but who still betrays the nation, I will honestly destroy him.67
Such pronouncements are indicative of the intention to destroy a group as such, one of the core 
tenets of the Genocide Convention. Yet the group in question could be arguably political (opponents 
of Jakarta), not ethnic. In practice, however, it is difficult to separate political identity from ethnic 
identity, particularly when ethnic groups or nationalities (such as the Papuans) become politicised. 
Arguably the destruction of Papuan nationalists (as a political group such a crime could constitute 
the crime against humanity of persecution) would result in the near-destruction or absolute 
subjugation of Papuan ethnicities. Moreover, the destruction, through violent means, of political 
elites and the subsequent destruction of Papuan’s right to political self-determination and cultural 
survival could set in motion the eventual physical disappearance of Papuans.
William Schabas argues that genocidal intent may include a form of recklessness, provided 
that there is “virtual certainty” that an act or omission will result in the destruction of the group in 
whole or in part.68 Some scholars also argue that the Genocide Convention goes beyond direct and 
indirect intent (dolus directus and dolus indirectus) to also constitute recklessness (dolus eventualis).69 
Reckless intent supposes that the perpetrator could foresee the possible consequences of their acts 
but that they lack the direct intention to bring about those consequences. John Quigley interprets 
the Genocide Convention in such a way that genocide may occur in situations where the perpetrator 
acts without genocidal purpose but where genocide is a foreseeable result.70
Many genocides targeting indigenous peoples fall somewhere in the grey region between dolus 
eventualis and dolus directus. The perpetrator may desire the destruction of the group, and even 
hope that their acts further that objective, yet they do not act directly to bring about the destruction 
of the group. In such genocides there is a kind of historical intentionality, rather than an immediate 
intentionality. This historical intentionality sees the destruction of the group as inevitable in the 
long term; it results in a set of policies which further this result in an incremental fashion. These 
policies may include, for example:
1. Destruction of cultural sustainability
2. Destruction of economic sustainability
3. Destruction of political sustainability
As genocide is primarily concerned with the protection of identity groups (nations, ethnicities, 
religions, and races), the destruction of a group’s essential life foundations (such as the ability 
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of group members to practice their culture, pass on traditional knowledge, feed themselves, and 
govern themselves) is pursuant to an intent to destroy the group in whole or in part.  
There is a fundamental normative flaw in the law’s construction of genocide: the assumption 
that cultural practices are not essential to physical survival. This assumption is grounded in a 
European, civilizing worldview which sees culture as being in direct opposition to corporeal needs 
and realities. In such conceptions culture is a matter of survival only in the sense that culture is 
connected to rationalism, thus the technological foundations of modern life. In many indigenous 
societies culture is intimately connected to traditional knowledge. Such knowledge is not just 
a matter of ritual and rite but also of survival in the physical world. As indigenous groups are 
separated from their connection to the physical world they are also separated from their primary 
means of security and survival. In other words, cultural genocide can also constitute a means 
of physical genocide. The alienation of indigenous groups, such as Papuans, from their culture 
may be a direct threat to their physical survival. The forced removal of indigenous peoples from 
their means of both food and cultural production is a direct threat to their physical survival. In 
West Papua the reduction of land available to indigenous Papuans, through the settlement of 
transmigrants and other forms of economic development, have resulted in a reduction in the 
lands necessary for indigenous Papuans to practice shifting cultivation – their traditional means 
of subsistence.71 
In many contexts direct killing may not be necessary to effectuate genocide. The Genocide 
Convention already recognizes this through its inclusion of such acts as the forcible transfer of 
children from one group to another group and the prevention of births. It is reasonable to consider 
that the scope of the convention can be interpreted so as to cover forms of cultural genocide, which 
are directed at the destruction of the group, or other policies which may lack direct intent but 
that will foreseeably lead to the destruction of the group. The intentionality of such acts can be 
inferred from the context and the perpetrating group’s view of the victim group.72 In situations 
where prejudicial ideologies and views are prevalent and the perpetrator acts, with knowledge, 
in complete disregard for the negative consequences of their acts on the victim group, then the 
perpetrator possesses an intent to destroy.  
How can we distinguish the intent to destroy from mere oppression? In colonial and 
neocolonial contexts the perpetrator group harbours the intention not only to dominate the victim 
group but to possess their living space in its entirety, irrespective of their reduced prospects for 
continuity and survival. Such groups consider their presence in a territory to be more worthy by 
virtue of their advanced civilization or enlightened ideology. Under the ideology John Docker 
calls supersessionism groups may even consider themselves to be history’s true heirs, with the 
implication that other, less worthy groups are inevitably bound to die off.73 Groups holding such 
ideological constructions may inculcate a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby they undermine the 
fundamental survival basis of groups deemed to be inferior; when these groups fail it is taken as 
proof of the inevitability of their disappearance. Structural forms of violence, such as the Indian 
great famine of 1899-1890, are only possible through the complete disregard shown to the lives of 
colonial subjects. We should also recall as well that omissions may be genocidal.74
There seems to be misperception among many scholars that the Genocide Convention 
contains a motive requirement. In particular they point to the phrase as such in article 2 of the 
convention (the intent to destroy the group as such).75 The Jelisic Appeals chamber judgement at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) discarded the notion, posited 
by the Trial Chamber in the same case, that hatred must be a motive in genocide.76 The Appeals 
Chamber found:
The personal motive of the perpetrator of the crime of genocide may be, for example, to obtain 
personal economic benefits, or political advantage or some form of power. The existence of 
a personal motive does not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent to 
commit genocide.77
Thus, instrumental genocides are also encompassed by the convention. The West Papua case, 
where crimes are often committed pursuant to economic goals, could be one such case.
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Even if the Indonesian state could be shown to be acting with intentionality or careless 
disregard, towards the welfare of Papuans, do the acts of the state of Indonesia amount to genocide? 
The Indonesian government disputes any genocidal intent; rather, it argues that its actions in West 
Papua have been directed at the suppression of a violent terrorist movement and the achievement 
of economic development.78 While there have assuredly been widespread killings and other acts of 
violence these still seem too sporadic to constitute a deliberate policy of annihilation. The Genocide 
Convention, of course, goes beyond mere killing to include acts such as the forcible transfer of 
children. One could argue that the inclusion of such acts goes beyond biological destructiveness to 
encompass cultural destruction. 
It might be the case that the Indonesians desire the destruction of the Papuans as a political 
and cultural community. Such destruction may not be directed towards the physical destruction 
of the members of the group, yet it undoubtedly targets the social relations and cultural 
knowledge necessary for the group’s survival in the long term.79 Like many indigenous peoples 
facing persecution in the name of progress, Papuan existence may be contingent on the absolute 
disappearance of separate Papuan political and cultural identity. In short, Indonesian policies may 
lack intentionality and urgency yet they do have genocidal implications in that they attack the 
sustainability of the group. How can genocide studies relate to such cases?
Reassessing Genocide: Hot and Cold Genocides
The lack of adequate engagement of policy-makers and theorists with colonial and neo-colonial 
slow-motion genocides is also a failure to engage with structural violence – violence in which a social 
structure prevents people from meeting their basic needs.80 There are several explanations for this 
analytical deficiency. Firstly, the concept of genocide largely arose from the historical context of the 
Holocaust. As such, there is a tendency among genocide scholars to ignore genocides which do not 
fit the Holocaust model of mass killing in pursuit of a racist ideology. 
Secondly, structural violence is often more subtle than mass killing. It entails undermining 
the conditions of life for targeted groups gradually, over years or even decades. Such genocides 
pose significant problems in terms of proof of criminal intentionality; in the absence of explicit 
statements of genocidal intent, structural violence requires a thorough understanding of complex 
socio-economic structures and policies.  
Finally, there is the possibility that genocide studies suffer from colonial biases. The great 
majority of genocide scholars are located in the Global North. Thus, in some sense, the privilege of 
many genocide scholars is built upon a foundation of past structural violence against indigenous 
and other subject peoples. We must ask whether genocide studies itself has the effect of merely 
reproducing, rather than challenging, existing power structures?
There is a need for a new analytical framework for genocide in order to account for cases, 
such as West Papua, where the disappearance of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group is 
gradual and incidental, rather than rapid and intentional. Such cases are still genocidal in the sense 
that the perpetrating group knowingly performs acts that contribute to the eventual destruction 
of a group. 
With this in mind it may be useful to conceptually distinguish between hot genocides and 
cold genocides.81 When we speak of temperature in this context we mean emotional passion and 
intensity of action. The concept of hot and cold war made a similar, but not identical, distinction 
between direct and indirect violence.82 The very notion of genocide contains a popular perception 
of racial hatred, and the desire to annihilate, notions which are undoubtedly intense. Yet, by 
maintaining such a narrow view of genocide we are blinding ourselves to alternative means for the 
destruction of groups. 
We can distinguish between hot and cold genocides on the basis of the following factors: 
emotion, (perpetrator) perceptions of the victim, the intention of the perpetrator, the speed at 
which genocide occurs, the tools utilised, and the primacy of instrumental motivations.  
Firstly, hot genocides are characterised by the passion/hatred of the perpetrator towards the 
victim group. This hatred is rooted in a sense of existential threat projected onto the victims. The 
victims are often seen as devious, sources of contamination, or evil. Hatred towards the victims is 
a source of inspiration and authorisation for genocidal killing. This hatred towards the victims is 
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consistent with Sternberg and 
Sternbergs’ Story-Based 
Theory of Hate which 
defines hatred as having 
three characteristics: the 
negation of intimacy, 
commitment, and passion.83  
In contrast, cold 
genocides may be 
passionless. They are not 
motivated by hate but by 
the perpetrators’ assumed 
supremacy over the victims. 
In the Holocaust, Jews 
were not merely seen as 
inferior but rather as “an 
aspect of the environment 
that had to be removed”; 
they were targeted not 
because of the supposedly 
disproportionate wealth 
that they possessed, but rather because they represented a mortal danger to the “Aryan race.”84 
Although in both cases the perpetrators are prejudiced towards the victims, in the case of cold 
genocides this prejudice may be manifested as pity, indifference, or annoyance rather than passion 
(anger/hate). 
In cases where the victim group is seen as threatening, physical violence is more likely to be 
utilised. Perhaps this threat hypothesis can explain the relatively higher levels of violence utilised 
by the Indonesian state in East Timor (estimates place war-related deaths at up to a quarter of the 
population), in comparison to West Papua.85 In West Papua anti-regime activity has been relatively 
limited and sporadic.
Secondly, hot genocides rely heavily on killing and other direct acts of destruction such as 
harming the victim group or intentionally starving them in concentration camps. In contrast, cold 
genocides undermine the conditions of life of the victim group or destroy them through gradual 
policies such as the transfer of children from the victim group to the perpetrator’s groups. The 
destruction of the victims’ culture, alienation and forced displacement from traditional lands, 
demographic dilution, and environmental destruction may also gradually contribute to the 
disappearance of the group.  
Thirdly, the perpetrators in hot genocides intend to destroy the victim group completely. 
By contrast in cold genocides the destruction of the victim group may be accomplished through 
its gradual disappearance. Disappearance can be affected through the extreme marginalisation or 
subjugation of the victim group, or its complete cultural assimilation. In one sense, this act of 
subjugation is more closely aligned to the crime against humanity of persecution than the crime of 
genocide, yet it is genocidal in that it still seeks (or foreshadows) the eventual disappearance of the 
victim group. Such destruction goes beyond normal acts of persecution.
Fourthly, in hot genocides the destruction of the targeted group takes place in a manner of 
a few years (such as occurred in The Holocaust) or months (such as occurred in Armenia and 
Rwanda). The victim groups’ perceived threatening nature towards the perpetrators necessitates 
their urgent destruction. In contrast, in cold genocides the destruction of the victim group is seen 
as inevitable rather than imperative. Such destruction is more a matter of evolution, of social 
Darwinism, rather than deliberate acts. We can also draw a parallel here with low-intensity armed 
conflicts, which, although relatively limited in mortality, still indicate the presence of sustained 
conflict.
Finally, in hot genocides instrumental motives, such as the maintenance of power, are often 
secondary to racial motives. Contrarily, in cold genocides instrumentality, such as the seizure 
Characteristic Hot Genocide Cold Genocide
1. Emotion Hate Supremacy
2. Victim Threatening Contemptible
3. Intention
(dolus specialis)
Annihilation (direct)
Disappearance through 
destruction or complete 
subjugation (indirect, 
eventual)
4. Speed
Fast (urgent,  
high-intensity)
Slow (inevitable, sustained, 
low-intensity)
5. Tools 
(actus reus)
Killing, assaults, 
concentration camps
Structural violence, 
biological genocide
6. Instrumentality Background Foreground
Table 1. Hot versus Cold Genocides.
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of natural resources, is often a primary motivation. However, we must reiterate the complexity 
of motive, and, consequently, that in both hot and cold genocides instrumental and prejudicial 
motives are present. Moreover, the motives of individual perpetrators may be instrumental (i.e. the 
theft of a neighbour’s property) even while group motives remain prejudicial. 
Genocide can shift from cold to hot in cases where victims resist, thus their perceived threat 
to perpetrators increases. This transition may be only temporary (isolated suppressive massacres) 
or it may result in a policy shift towards more intensive killing. Such a pattern characterised the 
mass killings occurring in Ntega and Marangara communes in northern Burundi in 1988 where a 
minor episode of Hutu violence was met by a massively disproportionate response from the Tutsi-
dominated army.86 Colonial genocides are often cold, as the perpetrators view indigenous peoples 
as being primitive, non-entities rather than an existential threat to the survival of the perpetrator 
group. This certainly seems to be the case in West Papua where indigenous Papuans are viewed as 
mere obstacles to development. 
The case of Tibet is an informative example of another (neo) colonial cold genocide. In Tibet 
under Chinese occupation there seems to have been no directly intentional policy of extermination, 
and yet Chinese policies in Tibet have recklessly and callously contributed to the deaths of well 
over a million Tibetans.87 From 1950 to 1959 Tibet experienced a grinding famine which killed more 
than a million people.88 Moreover, over 6000 monasteries and religious (Buddhist) buildings were 
destroyed during the Cultural Revolution in a campaign of cultural genocide, often accompanied 
by acts of brutality and violence.89 In the years after the Dalai Lama fled Tibet a further 73,200 
Tibetans died in prison and forced labor camps and more than 150,000 Tibetans were executed.90 
Furthermore Chinese policies have restricted births among ethnic Tibetans and brought millions 
of non-Tibetan migrants into Tibet.91 All of these processes have been driven by the paternalistic 
characterisation of Tibetans as feudal peoples (primitives) in need of upliftment, in the form of Han 
Chinese culture and Communist ideology. 
In some sense the genocide of Tibetans in China has actually moved from a hot phase, 
characterised by direct killings and violence, to a cold one, characterised by policies seeking to 
forcibly assimilate Tibetans. Perhaps the Cultural Revolution already did enough damage to the 
basis of Tibetan culture (such as the 90% reduction in the numbers of Buddhist monks) that hot 
genocide is no longer necessary, rather the Tibetans will slowly disappear in the face of ongoing 
cultural pressures. 
Critics of this typology might question why it is even necessary to gather cases which are 
questionable under the intentionality requirements of the Genocide Convention. Rather than 
seeking to exclude genuine victims of genocide, they are concerned that expanding notions of 
genocide only serves to water down the notion of genocide until it has no legal, explanatory, 
or normative power. However, one could also argue that the development of the notion of 
cold’genocide provides an explanatory framework for other cases of genocide where genocidal 
destruction is still intentional, but indirect. Paradoxically, in cases of cold genocide individuals 
may not be physically exterminated, even while the group is gradually destroyed. This gradual 
and intended destruction of the group is certainly genocidal in nature, even if it might not conform 
to existing notions of genocidal intent in the Genocide Convention.
 
Conclusion
There are several fictions embedded in the legal definition of genocide. Foremost among these is 
the notion that the destruction of a group only occurs through acts such as killing and biological 
genocide. In fact, the cultural and political destruction of a group, when coupled with the violent 
suppression of cultural and political identity, is pursuant to the destruction of the group. This 
is particularly true when the group in question is an indigenous group, where identity is often 
centred on kinship and the relationship to the land. The denial of the right to self-determination is 
a denial of the right to exist. Moreover, the pervasive surveillance and harassment that characterise 
authoritarian states may dissolve the bonds of trust that sustain kinship and clan relations.92
Even without expanding the definition of genocide under the convention, interpretations of 
genocide must be critically reconsidered so as to encompass cases of cold genocide. While many 
of the acts involved in low-intensity, cold genocides are already prohibited under an array of 
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human rights instruments, these instruments fail to capture the pernicious harm involved in the 
destruction of an ethnicity. 
Indonesia’s national motto is unity in diversity yet there has been far too much emphasis on 
unity as a cultural, economic, and political hegemonic project and not enough recognition of 
ethnic diversity. This has resulted in numerous minor and major ethnic conflicts and secessionist 
movements including, for example, West Papua, Aceh, the Molucca Islands, East Timor, and 
indigenous-settler conflicts among the Dyaks in Borneo. It has also led to systematic atrocities 
targeting political opponents of the State (such as occurred in East Timor from 1975-1999, as well 
as throughout Indonesia in the anti-Communist killings of 1965-1966).
Indonesia’s oppression of Papuans may be rooted in supremacist perceptions towards peoples 
called primitive rather than hatred, but this oppression still represents a deliberate attack on the 
sustainability of the group. Effectively Papuans “do not regard themselves as Indonesians and 
are not regarded as such by other Indonesians.”3 How then can such a group survive within a 
militarised, hegemonic state? 
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